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THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT’S FIRST-TO-FILE BAR: 
HOW THE PARTICULARITY REQUIREMENT OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE MILITATES AGAINST 
COMBATING FRAUD 
Joel Deuth+ 
Congress enacted the False Claims Act (FCA) to establish liability for any 
person who knowingly submits, or causes another to submit, a false claim or 
record to the government.1  The Senate Judiciary Committee clarified in its 
committee report that the FCA was not designed “to produce class actions or 
multiple separate suits based on identical facts and circumstances.”2  To 
achieve this goal, Congress enacted 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5), known as the 
“first-to-file” jurisdictional bar, to help achieve this goal.3  Generally, the  
first-to-file bar excludes subsequent complaints from consideration after a suit 
with the same scheme has already been filed.4  Courts have consistently 
struggled to balance the first-to-file bar with the FCA’s legislative intent of 
encouraging private citizens, or “relators,” to promptly alert the government of 
potential fraud.5  The FCA’s qui tam provisions,6 which allow relators to bring 
                     
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2014, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; 
B.A., 2007, University of Minnesota, Morris. The author wishes to thank David Metzger for his 
unwavering patience and outstanding feedback during the initial stages of this Comment as well 
as the Catholic University Law Review staff members for their countless hours invested in 
perfecting it.  Any errors are attributable solely to the author. 
 1. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 et seq. (2006). 
 2. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 25 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5290; see 31 
U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006). 
 3. § 3730(b)(5) (“When a person brings an action under this subsection, no person other 
than the Government may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts underlying the 
pending action.”); see Campbell v. Redding Med. Ctr., 421 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(explaining that § 3730(b)(5) is known as the first-to-file bar and encourages a “race to the 
courthouse” by those with knowledge of fraudulent activity against the government).  
Commentators have taken issue with the “race to the courthouse” description because it implies 
that relators know that other relators exist.  See Lesley A. Skillen & Megan M. Scheurer, Who’s 
on First: 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5), 44 FALSE CL. ACT & QUI TAM Q. REV. 8, at *1 (2007).  
Typically, however, the multiple relators know nothing about each other’s existence, which 
frequently results in lawsuits over jurisdictional bars.  Id. 
 4. See Marc S. Raspanti & David M. Laigaie, Current Practice and Procedure Under the 
Whistleblower Provisions of the Federal False Claims Act, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 23, 35 (1998) 
(stating that once a person brings an action under this provision of the False Claims Act, “no 
person other than the Government may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts 
underlying the pending action”). 
 5. See United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 1189 (9th Cir. 
2001) (noting that the first-to-file rule’s objective is to incentivize relators to alert the government 
of fraudulent activity in a time-sensitive manner); 1 JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND 
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lawsuits on behalf of the government, also provide further evidence of 
congressional intent to encourage relators to bring actions alleging fraud 
against the government.7  Judicial inconsistency in applying the first-to-file bar 
results in substantial costs to relators and the judicial system.8  However, these 
burdens can be eliminated by “faithful application of the plain language and 
intent” of the statute.9 
Section 3730(b)(5) reads: “When a person brings an action under this 
subsection, no person other than the Government may intervene or bring a 
related action based on the facts underlying the pending action.”10  
Historically, courts battled over whether facts needed to be identical or 
material.11  More recently, at least two circuit courts of appeals have struggled 
with a different portion of the statute—the relationship between the first-to-file 
                                                
QUI TAM ACTIONS 4-200.4 (4th ed. 2013) (noting that the 1986 amendments to the False Claims 
Act were meant to encourage relators to notify the government quickly of unknown frauds). 
 6. § 3730(b)(1) (providing for a private right of action). 
 7. See Note, The History and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 WASH U. L. Q. 81, 81 (1972) 
(referencing the House Committee report, which states that qui tam suits encourage enforcement 
of statutes).  Through the 1986 FCA amendments, Congress sought to make it significantly easier 
for private citizens to bring qui tam actions on the government’s behalf.  See Todd J. Canni, 
Who’s Making False Claims, The Qui Tam Plaintiff or the Government Contractor? A Proposal 
to Amend the FCA to Require That All Qui Tam Plaintiffs Possess Direct Knowledge, 37 PUB. 
CONT. L.J. 1, 7 (2007) (explaining that the FCA 1986 amendments were meant to rectify a 
problem created by the 1943 amendments that effectively barred qui tam suits). 
 8. See BOESE, supra note 5, at 4-200.4 to 4-200.5 (listing some of the social costs imposed 
as: (1) forcing the first relator to enter agreements with later-filing relators for shared recoveries; 
(2) reducing recovery to first-to-file relators; (3) providing rewards to undeserving relators; and 
(4) increasing overall litigation costs). 
 9. Id. at 4-200.5. 
 10. § 3730(b)(5) (emphasis added). 
 11. See United States ex rel. Chovanec v. Apria Healthcare Grp., Inc., 606 F.3d 361, 363 
(7th Cir. 2010) (citing a number of courts that have interpreted the term “facts” to mean “material 
facts” or “essential facts”); see also United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., LP, 
579 F.3d 13, 32–33 (1st Cir. 2009) (adopting the essential facts standard but refusing to grant 
first-to-file protection to the original suit because the original complaint failed to allege all of the 
essential facts); United States ex rel. Branch Consultants v. Allstate Ins. Co., 560 F.3d 371,  
377–79 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting the adoption of the material elements test by other circuits 
interpreting the provision); Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 971 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(adopting the principle that the first-to-file bar applies when two complaints allege the same 
“essential facts” even if there are slightly different details); United States ex rel. Grynberg v. 
Koch Gateway Pipeline Co., 390 F.3d 1276, 1279–80 (10th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the identical 
facts test because it is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute and to the purpose of  
§ 3730(b)(5)); United States ex rel. Hampton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 318 F.3d 214, 
217–18 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (adopting the material facts test based on the analysis completed by 
other appellate courts); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Col, 243 F.3d 1181,  
1188–89 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the identical facts test in favor of the material facts test based 
on the plain language of the statute); United States ex rel. LaCorte v. SmithKline Beecham 
Clinical Labs., Inc., 149 F.3d 227, 232–33 (3d Cir. 1998) (affirming first-to-file protection for the 
original suit under the material facts test). 
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bar, a jurisdictional bar by design,12 and the particularity requirement in Rule 
9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.13  Resolving how to characterize 
Rule 9(b)’s role under these circuit court decisions is significant, because Rule 
9(b)’s application to the first-to-file bar impacts the original purpose of the 
FCA.14 
In 2005, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit confronted the Rule 
9(b) issue in Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., a lawsuit filed by a private 
citizen alleging the same material facts as a previously filed suit.15  The second 
relator in the case argued that the first-filed suit should not bar the later-filed 
suit under § 3730(b)(5) because the first complaint failed to state a claim with 
sufficient particularity under Rule 9(b).16  Agreeing with the second relator, the 
court held that a “fatally-broad complaint” that did not satisfy Rule 9(b) was 
not a complaint and thus the court could not exclude subsequent complaints 
under the first-to-file bar.17 
In 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
confronted a similar but not identical fact pattern in United States ex rel. 
Batiste v. SLM Corp., in which a private citizen brought suit alleging the same 
material facts as a previously filed complaint.18  The D.C. Circuit, in contrast 
                     
 12. See BOESE, supra note 5, at 4-181 (noting numerous courts that have treated the  
first-to-file bar as a “threshold jurisdictional provision”). 
 13. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity 
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.  Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions 
of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”).  Compare United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM 
Corp., 740 F. Supp. 2d 98, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding that even if a claim fails Rule 9(b)’s 
particularity requirements, a court may still bar subsequently filed claims alleging the same 
material facts under the first-to-file bar), with Walburn, 431 F.3d at 972 (holding that an original 
claim that fails the particularity requirement is “legally infirm from its inception,” and, therefore, 
the first-to-file bar is inapplicable to subsequent filed claims alleging the same material facts). 
 14. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266–67 
(stating that the purpose of the amendments is to encourage private individuals to come forward if 
they have knowledge of government fraud); see also Mike Scarcella, How Similar Is Too Small?: 
D.C. Circuit to Weigh Whether Past Filing Could Jeopardize Whistleblower Suit, 34 NAT’L L.J. 
27, 27, 32 (2011) (quoting a government contract attorney who said that the D.C. Circuit’s Batiste 
decision could “reduce the number of whistleblower suits”). 
 15. See Walburn, 431 F.3d at 969 (addressing whether the failure to comply with Rule 9(b) 
makes the first-to-file bar inapplicable). 
 16. Id. at 972 (citing United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 342 F.3d 634, 
641–43 (6th Cir. 2003)) (acknowledging previous cases that required actions under the FCA to 
comply with Rule 9(b)). 
 17. Id. at 972–73 (reasoning that such a “fatally-broad complaint,” which fails to provide 
the time, place, and content of a fraudulent claim, does not further the FCA’s purpose of notifying 
the government of potential fraud because a flawed complaint cannot provide sufficient notice to 
the government). 
 18. 659 F.3d 1204, 1206–07 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (considering whether the first-to-file rule 
applies when the first relator fails to meet the requirements of Rule 9(b)).  Notably, the Batiste 
and Walburn facts are slightly different because the first-filed complaint in Walburn was 
dismissed under the public disclosure bar, whereas the first-filed complaint in Batiste was 
dismissed for failing to obtain counsel.  See infra Part I.E. 
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to the Sixth Circuit, held that, notwithstanding Rule 9(b), subsequent 
complaints alleging the same material facts will be barred under § 3730(b)(5) 
as long as a first-filed complaint was pending at the time the second complaint 
was filed.19  The court reasoned that Walburn’s approach put courts in the 
uncomfortable position of determining the sufficiency of a complaint in 
another jurisdiction and could result in two courts disagreeing over whether a 
complaint meets Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement.20 
This Comment examines the Sixth and D.C. Circuits’ approaches as to 
whether Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement should be read into the  
first-to-file bar such that complaints must satisfy Rule 9(b)’s threshold both at 
the initial court filing and later, when challenged on jurisdiction grounds under 
§ 3730(b)(5).  To resolve the conflict, this Comment recommends that future 
courts adhere to a truly exception-free first-to-file bar by avoiding arguments 
raised by both the Sixth and D.C. Circuits. 
This Comment first traces the steps of the FCA from its inception in 1863, in 
response to contractor fraud during the Civil War, to the 1986 amendments, 
which brought the FCA into modern times.  This Comment then provides  an 
in-depth review of Rule 9(b), which requires fraud claims to be alleged with 
particularity.  Despite Rule 9(b)’s relatively straightforward language, this 
Comment examines how courts have applied the rule to the first-to-file bar and 
highlights how district courts are struggling to reach a resolution under the 
circuit court decisions.  Next, this Comment examines why the Sixth Circuit 
concluded that a complaint that violates Rule 9(b) is not a complaint for 
purposes of the first-to-file bar.  By comparison, this Comment also analyzes 
the D.C. Circuit’s decision that Rule 9(b) need not apply at the first-to-file 
stage because it is already applied at the filing stage of an FCA suit.  This 
Comment concludes by recommending that courts adopt an exception-free 
first-to-file bar that closely adheres to the FCA’s legislative intent and general 
purpose.  This Comment argues that Rule 9(b) should not be utilized in a 
                     
 19. Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1210 (finding that the first-filed complaint need not meet the 
heightened pleading requirements under Rule 9(b) to invoke the first-to-file bar).  In the general 
first-to-file context, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have concluded that a pending first-filed 
complaint precludes subsequent complaints, even if the first-filed complaint is later dismissed, 
because the earlier complaint alerted the government to the essential facts of potential fraud.  See 
United States ex rel. Chovanec v. Apria Healthcare Grp. Inc., 606 F.3d 361, 365 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(stating that a later-filed suit is permissible when a first-filed action is dismissed without 
prejudice, or if it alleges a different transaction); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft 
Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a first-filed action precludes a subsequent 
complaint if the first-filed action was still pending when the later-filed action was filed). 
 20. Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1210.  The Batiste court’s effort to avoid disagreement among the 
district courts on the same issue may have been influenced by the purported tendency among 
appellate judges to suppress disagreement out of fear that it is detrimental to the judicial system.  
See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Measure of the Doubt: Dissent, Indeterminancy, and Interpretation at 
the Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1033 (2007) (stating that at the appellate level, 
judges seek consensus even if it means compromising their own opinions on the ultimate decision 
of the case). 
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manner that subverts the primary purpose of one of the most important  
anti-fraud statutes.  An overly vigorous application of Rule 9(b) to the  
first-to-file bar risks eroding the anti-fraud effectiveness of the FCA and 
discouraging private citizens from filing suits. 
I.  THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT THROUGHOUT HISTORY: HOW CONGRESS HAS 
CONTINUED ITS EFFORTS TO PERFECT AN EFFECTIVE STATUTE 
Senator Charles Grassley, rationalizing the need for the False Claims 
Reform Act, stated, “[c]ontractors have us over a barrel.  Our choice is 
inexorably clear.  If we like being over a barrel, I would suggest we leave the 
law the way it is and instead grin and bear continued rapes and pillages of the 
Treasury.”21  From the beginning of the FCA’s existence in 1863 to the major 
amendments enacted in 1986,22 lawmakers have sought to prevemt fraud 
perpetrated against the government by both incentivizing private individuals to 
bring forth claims and enforcing those claims when they assist the 
government.23 
Congress enacted the FCA to prevent contractors from defrauding the 
government during the Civil War.24  A primary purpose of the statute was to 
“encourage individuals to ferret out fraud against the government.”25  When 
                     
 21. 131 CONG. REC. 22,322 (1985) (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley).  Senator Charles 
Grassley, R-Iowa, and Representative Howard Berman, D-Cal., shepherded the 1986 legislation 
enacted in response to court opinions that placed increasingly restrictive measures on qui tam 
relators.  See Raspanti & Laigaie, supra note 4, at 27 (noting the leadership role of Sen. Grassley 
and Rep. Berman in the passage of the 1986 amendments). 
 22. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-562, § 3, § 3730(b),(d), 100 Stat. 
3153, 3154–57 (1986); see S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986) (stating that the purpose of the 
amendments is to encourage private individuals with knowledge of fradulent claims presented to 
the government to come forward). 
 23. 78 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts, Proof of Violation Under the False Claims Act, § 2 
(reinforcing Congress’s purpose of the amended FCA to encourage private enforcement suits). 
 24. 131 CONG. REC. 22,322 (1985) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (recounting the enactment 
of the FCA as a “response to Civil War era horror stories that sound all too familiar, contractors 
selling boxes of sawdust in place of boxes of muskets, and reselling horses to the cavalry two and 
three times”); see also Campbell v. Redding Med. Ctr., 421 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting 
that the FCA was enacted during the Civil war to address fraud); BOESE, supra note 5, at 1–5 
(stating that the original FCA was known as the “Informer’s Act” and the “Lincoln Law”); 
Jonathan T. Brollier, Mutiny of the Bounty: A Moderate Change in the Incentive Structure of Qui 
Tam Actions Brought Under the False Claims Act, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 693, 699 (2006) (“During the 
Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln groused that his troops found sawdust instead of 
gunpowder when they pried open ammunition crates at the front.” (quoting ANDY PASZTOR, 
WHEN THE PENTAGON WAS FOR SALE 11 (1995))); Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1, 43–44 (2002) (“[T]he FCA provided the federal government with a way of combating 
the fraud suffered by the Union Army when it received deliveries of defective or nonexisting 
military supplies.”). 
 25. 131 CONG. REC. 22,323 (1985) (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley) (arguing that 
confronting fraud was even more crucial in 1985 because, at that time, the government was 
spending billions of dollars to contract many of its functions). 
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Congress amended the FCA in 1943, it sought to exclude “parasitical suits,”26 
which occur when the government has already obtained information regarding 
the alleged fraud before a private citizen brings suit under the qui tam 
whistleblower provisions.27  In response to court interpretations that narrowly 
construed the 1943 amendments, lawmakers amended the FCA again in 1986 
to repeal the restrictive interpretations of the qui tam provisions in order to 
encourage private citizens to bring forth their lawsuits.28 
In 2011, the Department of Justice recovered three billion dollars from civil 
cases involving fraud against the government, demonstrating the effectiveness 
of the FCA.29  More notably, 2.8 billion of the 3 billion dollars recovered was 
the result of the FCA’s whistleblower provisions.30  Given the effectiveness of 
the qui tam provisions, the U.S. government has a significant interest in 
                     
 26. Leading up to congressional approval of the 1943 amendments, the U.S. Attorney 
General suggested that Congress repeal the qui tam provisions because of the rise in “parasitic 
lawsuits.”  See Canni, supra note 7, at 6.  The phrase, “parasitic lawsuits,” was gleaned from suits 
in which individuals alleged facts based on public sources, rather than independent knowledge, to 
reap the monetary rewards.  Id. at 5–6.  In fact, in January 1943, the Supreme Court held that a 
private relator who had received information about fraudulent activity from a previous indictment 
was permitted to receive a reward.  See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537,  
545–46 (1943) (noting that nothing in the statute creates an exception to the ability of a private 
plaintiff to recover a monetary award). 
 27. See Campbell, 421 F.3d at 823 (noting that courts read the 1943 amendments as 
foreclosing all qui tam actions if the government had knowledge of the fraud, even in those 
instances where the relator discovered the fraud independently); see also Brollier, supra note 24, 
at 699–700 (stating that the 1943 amendments modified the “faulty portion” of the FCA that 
“permitted relators to copy criminal indictments and then come forward, prosecute the claim, and 
collect a bounty as if they had ferreted out the false claim themselves”). 
 28. See J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam 
Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 561 (2000) (acknowledging public pressure to amend the FCA 
and describing the 1980s as “the era of the $435 hammer, the $640 toilet seat cover, and the 
$7622 coffee maker,” because the government experienced a number of scandals involving 
defense contractors excessively billing the government); Brollier, supra note 24, at 699 (“The 
1986 amendments . . . did not create the False Claims Act, but rather added teeth to a Civil War 
era statute.”); Raspanti & Laigaie, supra note 4, at 27 (stating that the 1986 amendments 
“reinvigorated the False Claims Act” by concentrating on the relator’s role and eliminating 
restrictions that had developed in the courts over time). 
 29. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers $3 Billion in False Claims 
Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2011 (Dec. 19, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa 
/pr/2011/December/11-civ-1665.html (observing that 2011 was the second consecutive year for 
recoveries over three billion dollars). 
 30. Id.  (stating that qui tam provisions peaked at 638 in Fiscal Year 2011).  The relevant 
whistleblower provision states: 
A person may bring a civil action for a violation of section 3729 for the person and for 
the United States Government. The action shall be brought in the name of the 
Government. The action may be dismissed only if the court and the Attorney General 
give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting. 
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2006). 
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continuing to encourage private citizens to bring suits on the government’s 
behalf.31 
A.  The Qui Tam Provisions’ Purpose Is to Enlist the Help of Private Citizens 
in the Government’s Effort to Combat Fraud 
The FCA’s qui tam provisions32 incentivize private citizens to bring actions 
alleging that others are defrauding the government.33  If the private citizen’s 
suit results in a successful monetary judgment, the private citizen is entitled to 
a portion of that reward.34  Congress determined that increased rewards would 
advance the goal of the qui tam provisions.35 
Given the potentially significant monetary rewards available to qui tam 
plaintiffs, the FCA includes certain provisions that bar some qui tam actions.36  
In addition to the “public disclosure” bar37 and “original source” exception,38 
                     
 31. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting of Appellant at 2, United 
States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204 (2011) (No. 10-7140) (stressing the United 
States’ support of the correct application of the FCA because of the FCA’s impact in reducing 
fraud and recovering losses); see also Bucy, supra note 24, at 52 (explaining that because of the 
FCA’s “explosive growth” in private actions, federal government intervention is “increasingly 
difficult”). 
 32. See Note, supra note 7, at 83 (stating that the literal translation of the expression “qui 
tam” is “he who as much for the king as for himself”). 
 33. § 3730(b), (d); see Harvinder S. Anand, Note, Competing Relators and Competing 
Objectives Under the False Claims Act: Barring Subsequent Claims Should Look Beyond the 
Plain Language of Section 3730(b)(5), 28 PUB. CONT. L.J. 89, 90 (1998) (stating that “[relators] 
are motivated by the prospect of a big payday” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 34. § 3730(d) (awarding the qui tam plaintiff at least fifteen percent of the proceeds if the 
government proceeds with the action brought by the qui tam plaintiff, and between twenty-five 
and thirty percent if the government does not).  However, the prospect of a monetary reward may 
also prompt private citizens to file complaints even if they are aware of a first-filed complaint, 
which contradicts the jurisdictional bar’s inherent purpose of preventing “duplicative recoveries.”  
See Anand, supra note 33, at 90. Congress increased the award amount in 1986 after hearing from 
witnesses that the previous rewards were insufficient to guarantee financial security.  False 
Claims Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 99-562, Sec. 3, § 3730(d), 100 Stat. 3153,  
3156–57 (1986); S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 28 (1986) (stating that a ten percent minimum recovery is 
a “finder’s fee,” to which a relator should have a right for bringing the action). 
 35. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 28.  However, Congress staggered the allowable percentages for 
recovery based on the contribution of the relator as determined by the court.  Id.  The committee 
report highlights that such a risk analysis by the relator requires them to first read and understand 
the statute.  Id. (noting that a “potential plaintiff may decide it is too risky to proceed in the face 
of a totally unpredictable recovery”). 
 36. § 3730(e)(4).  Courts have no jurisdiction over suits based on the public disclosure of 
allegations or transactions generally, unless the action is brought by the original source of the 
information.  Id. 
 37. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (“No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section 
based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions . . . unless the action is brought by 
the Attorney General.”). 
 38. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (“‘[O]riginal source’ means an individual who has direct and 
independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily 
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Congress enacted the first-to-file bar to prevent “class actions or multiple 
separate suits based on identical facts and circumstances.”39  In its entirety, the 
first-to-file bar reads, “[w]hen a person brings an action under [§ 3730(b)], no 
person other than the Government may intervene or bring a related action 
based on the facts underlying the pending action.”40  Generally, this provision 
suggests that only the first-filed suit will survive if two or more qui tam suits 
have been filed alleging the same scheme.41  Consequently, courts have 
developed tests to determine whether a subsequently filed suit alleges the same 
facts as the first suit the extent that it should be precluded.42 
B.  Courts Adopt the Broader “Material” Facts Test over the “Identical” 
Facts Interpretation of the First-to-File Bar 
Historically, courts interpreted § 3730(b)(5)’s language of “facts underlying 
the pending action” in two different ways.43  Some courts interpreted the 
phrase as barring actions alleging facts identical to those alleged in a pending 
action, while others would only bar actions alleging the same material or 
essential facts.44  Significant consequences result from the “identical facts” and 
“material facts” tests.45  For instance, under the “identical facts” test, relators 
may be discouraged from filing complaints, even if they have knowledge of 
fraudulent activity, due to the likelihood that other relators will bring similar 
actions.46  If the cases had slightly different facts that fall outside of  the 
“identical facts” requirement, the FCA’s monetary reward would be 
                                                
provided the information to the Government before filing an action.”); see Campbell v. Redding 
Med. Ctr., 421 F.3d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that a non-original source is a source that 
did not contribute to the government’s awareness of the fraud, whereas an original source 
contains valuable information that may assist the government in prosecuting false claims). 
 39. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 25; see § 3730(b)(5) (preventing duplicative recoveries). 
 40. § 3730(b)(5). 
 41. Skillen & Scheurer, supra note 3, at *69 (stating that the “race” to get an FCA suit filed 
first implies that the private citizens know of each other’s existence, which is unlikely). 
 42. See infra text accompanying notes 43–46. 
 43. § 3730(b)(5). 
 44. Compare United States ex rel. Dorsey v. Warren E. Smith Cmty. Health/Mental 
Retardation & Substance Abuse Ctrs., No. 95-7446, 1997 WL 381761 (E.D. Pa. June 25, 1997)  
(adopting an “identical facts” test), overruled by United States ex rel. LaCorte v. SmithKline 
Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc., 149 F.3d 227, 233–34 (3d Cir. 1998), as recognized in United 
States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 1188–89 (9th Cir. 2001) (reasoning 
that barring actions that state only facts identical to the pending action is contrary to the plain 
language and intent of the first-to-file bar), with United States ex rel. Chovanec v. Apria 
Healthcare Grp., Inc., 606 F3d 361, 363 (7th Cir. 2010)  (adopting a “material facts” test). 
 45. See Anand, supra note 33, at 92. 
 46. LaCorte, 149 F.3d at 234 (arguing that the “identical facts” test means that a number of 
relators could receive a share of recovery from the same fraudulent conduct, thus reducing the 
monetary reward). 
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diminished.47  Furthermore, the government would receive notice after the first 
claim, and therefore, additional claims would no longer serve the primary 
purpose of notifying the government of fraud.48  Another implication suggested 
by some commentators is that the identical facts test gives defendants an 
advantage when  numerous qui tam suits are filed against the same defendant.49 
Over time, however, courts resolved the dispute between the two 
interpretations in favor of the “essential” or “material facts” test.50  To reach 
this conclusion, courts interpreting the statute noted the purposes of the qui tam 
provisions and concluded that these purposes counseled against the adoption of 
the identical facts test.51  In United States ex rel. Chovanec v. Apria Healthcare 
Group, Inc., the Seventh Circuit held that an “identical facts” test would make 
the word “related” in § 3730(b)(5) irrelevant.52  However, the court also stated 
that not all similar frauds are related because that would remove the  
“same-facts” language from the statute.53  Instead, the court looked to other 
circuits that have held that “material” or “essential” facts were those “on which 
the original relator [was] entitled to compensation if the suit prevail[ed].”54 
                     
 47. Id. (stating how a decreased reward disincentivizes private citizens from bringing qui 
tam actions). 
 48. See id. (recognizing that any interpretation of the first-to-file bar must balance the 1986 
amendments’ competing goals of providing sufficient incentives to citizens with insider 
information and discouraging opportunistic plaintiffs from attempting to capitalize on someone 
else’s efforts). 
 49. See Anand, supra note 33, at 92 (explaining that a first-filed, sufficiently broad 
complaint would contain any details that later-filed suits tried to allege and, therefore, those 
subsequent complaints would be barred, leaving the defendant to respond to only one case). 
 50. See United States ex rel. Chovanec v. Apria Healthcare Grp., Inc., 606 F.3d 361, 363 
(7th Cir. 2010) (stating that when a statute contains the term “facts,” courts often held that it 
means “material facts”). 
 51. See United States ex rel. Hampton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 318 F.3d 214, 
217–18 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (reaching its decision after recounting the legislative history of the qui 
tam provisions as “repeated congressional efforts to walk a fine line between encouraging 
whistle-blowing and discouraging opportunistic behavior” (quoting United States ex rel. 
Springfield Terminal Ry. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1994))). 
 52. 606 F.3d at 633 (reasoning that the word “related” requires courts to examine both the 
claim’s linguistic and functional context, which would not be the case under the “identical facts” 
test because only the words of the claim would be scrutinized). 
 53. Id. (rejecting the idea that a case be barred for arising out of a generally similar 
wrongdoing).  The Chovanec court continued by stating that “[i]n Einstein’s universe, everything 
is related to everything else. A materiality rule accommodates both parts of the statutory  
phrase-though at the expense of posing the question what ‘material’ means.  It is a protean term 
that requires further analysis.” Id. 
 54. Id. (citing Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 971 (6th Cir. 2005); 
Hampton, 318 F.3d at 217–18; United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 
1187–89 (9th Cir. 2001); United States ex rel. LaCorte v. Smith-Kline Beecham Clinical Labs., 
Inc., 149 F.3d 227, 232–34 (3d Cir. 1998)). 
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Nevertheless, the “material” or “essential” facts test is nuanced depending 
on the circuit.55  In United States ex rel. Smith v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 
Inc., the court adopted a hybrid approach that barred later claims unless: “(1) it 
alleges a different type of wrongdoing, based on different material facts than 
those alleged in the earlier suit; and (2) it gives rise to a separate recovery of 
actual damages by the government.”56 
Despite the growing complexity in applying the first-to-file bar, as 
evidenced by the initial disagreement regarding the “identical” and “material” 
facts tests, the bar’s continued application is justified because of its essence of 
encouraging prompt notification of potential wrongdoing against the 
government.57  As a group of commentators lamented: “[i]t may well be that 
the first-to-file rule, like democracy, is the worst possible system, except for all 
the others.”58 
C.  Understanding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and Its Particularity 
Requirement in Alleging Fraud 
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[i]n alleging 
fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake.  Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions 
of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”59  Rule 9(b)’s particularity 
requirement is justified by “the desire to protect the reputation of the 
defendant” and “the need to afford an opponent adequate notice in order to 
prepare a responsive pleading.”60  Due to the minimal legislative history that 
explains the precise instances in which Rule 9(b) should be applied, courts 
have developed its purpose over time.61  In Odom v. Microsoft Corp., the Ninth 
Circuit noted that the relator must identify the fraudulent party and state the 
time, place, and content of the fraud to comply with the Rule 9(b) 
                     
 55. United States ex rel. Smith v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 2d 64, 75–76 
(D. Conn. 2005) (stating that the Third, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have adopted a “same material 
facts” test, while the Tenth Circuit takes into account the “core fact or general conduct relied 
upon in the first qui tam action”); see Skillen & Scheurer, supra note 3, at 72 (pointing out that 
the Sixth Circuit considered multiple circuit court precedents in adopting the “essential facts” 
test). 
 56. 411 F. Supp. 2d at 76 (quoting United States ex rel. Capella v. United Techs. Corp., No. 
3:94-CV-2063 (EBB), 1999 WL 464536, at *9 (D. Conn. June 3, 1999)). 
 57. See Skillen & Scheurer, supra note 3, at 75–76 (describing the usefulness of the  
first-to-file bar). 
 58. Id. at 77. 
 59. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 60. William M. Richman, Donald E. Lively & Patricia Mell, The Pleading of Fraud: 
Rhymes Without Reason, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 959, 961 (1987) (criticizing these justifications 
because the “meager analysis done by courts that mechanically advert to reputation interests has 
left too many questions unanswered and competing interests unfactored”). 
 61. See id. at 965–66 (noting that Rule 9(b) has not been amended since appearing in the 
first draft of the Federal Rules in 1936, and congressional hearings have not discussed the rule). 
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requirement.62   In Bly-Magee v. California, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
relator’s first amended complaint failed to satisfy Rule 9(b) because the 
complaint lacked the requisite particularity.63  Similar to the Ninth Circuit’s 
approach in Odom, the Bly-Magee court stated that Rule 9(b) gives notice to 
defendants of specific fraudulent conduct against which they must defend and 
deters complaints as a “pretext for the discovery of unknown wrongs, to 
protect [defendants] from the harm that comes from being subject to fraud 
charges.”64 
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit, in Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., held 
that Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,65 when read in conjunction 
with Rule 9(b), resulted in requiring a “pleader [to] state the time, place and 
content of the false misrepresentations, the fact misrepresented and what was 
retained or given up as a consequence of the fraud.”66  In United State ex rel. 
Ortega v. Columbia Healthcare Inc., the D.C. district court recognized the 
frequently cited purpose of 9(b) of providing notice to the defendant to prepare 
an adequate case.67  However, the court went on to highlight that the D.C. 
Circuit has taken “a generous approach” to the extent that it has ruled that 
                     
 62. 486 F.3d 541, 553 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming that Rule 9(b) gives the defendant time to 
prepare an adequate answer to the allegations, but under the facts in the case, the defendants were 
not disadvantaged by the plaintiffs’ failure to provide names of employees engaged in fraud).  In 
the case, the plaintiff alleged that Microsoft and Best Buy entered into an agreement whereby 
Microsoft would promote Best Buy’s online store if Best Buy agreed to promote MSN, an 
Internet access service owned by Microsoft.  Id. 
 63. 236 F.3d 1014, 1018–19 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the allegations made in the 
complaint were too broad and had “no particularized supporting detail”).  In Bly-Magee, the 
plaintiff, a former employee of a California non-profit agency that provided services to disabled 
and elderly individuals, filed suit against California for misappropriating federal funds that were 
appropriated to the state for vocational rehabilitation services.  Id. at 1016. 
 64. Id. at 1018.  But see Christopher M. Fairman, An Invitation to the Rulemakers—Strike 
Rule 9(b), 38 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 281, 292 (2004) (arguing that, in certain circumstances, 
reputational harm is an unpersuasive basis for the Rule’s reasoning because it is unclear how 
fraud differs from other equally serious claims, such as professional malpractice). 
 65. FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”); see United States ex 
rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., 501 F.3d 493, 503 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that technical 
pleading requirements such as those under Rule 9(b) are rejected by Rule 8 in favor of “notice 
pleading,” which is designed to reach the action’s merits). 
 66. 16 F.3d 1271, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that where securities fraud is alleged based 
on the plaintiffs’ assertions, the complaint must also plead sufficient facts).  In the case, the 
plaintiffs were members of class that had purchased defendant-MCI’s common stock and alleged 
that MCI made optimistic statements and projections of future earnings that falsely inflated the 
price of its common stock.  Id. at 1273–74.  The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint for 
failure to meet the heightened particularity standard of Rule 9(b).  Id. at 1276. 
 67. 240 F. Supp. 2d 8, 18 (D.D.C. 2003) (stating that the purpose is to “ensure that 
defendants have sufficient notice of the claims against them to prepare a defense”).  The plaintiff 
in Ortega alleged that Columbia Healthcare (HCA) was fraudulently procuring certification that 
allowed it to submit claims for Medicare reimbursement.  Id. at 10–11.  HCA moved to dismiss 
the complaint for failure to plead fraud with particularity.  Id. at 18. 
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“9(b) does not completely vitiate the liberality of Rule 8.”68  Perhaps the best 
statement to summarize the D.C. Circuit’s view of Rule 9(b) is from United 
States ex rel. Harris v. George Washington Primary Care Associates, in which 
the court stated that “one of the purposes of 9(b) is to prevent such ‘fishing 
expeditions’ that are based only on vague and unsubstantiated claims.”69 
Because Rule 9(b) requires fraud to be stated with particularity and because 
the FCA is an anti-fraud statute, the particularity requirement should apply 
when an FCA case is initially filed.70  The D.C. Circuit cited this principle in 
United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., for example, to strike down the 
argument that Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement should also apply at the 
first-to-file stage, stating that “[e]ven without grafting a Rule 9(b) requirement 
onto the first-to-file rule, the first plaintiff’s complaint is still subject to the 
Rule 9(b) pleading requirements in order for a court to hear the case.”71 
Despite the apparent unanimity among the courts on whether Rule 9(b) 
should apply to qui tam actions, some commentators are advocating to change 
the Rule’s application under the FCA.72  One commentator argued that courts 
should adopt a standard that considers particularity under Rule 9(b) sufficient 
when the relator establishes the fraudulent scheme with some detail.73  Under 
                     
 68. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1385–86 (D.C. Cir. 
1981)) (conceding that Rule 9(b) requires more particularity than Rule 8 but noting that “a 
complaint is not deficient merely because it fails to set out a prima facie case” (citing Sparrow v. 
United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 2000))). 
 69. No. 98-7192, 1999 WL 1021936, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1999) (citing Viacom, Inc. v. 
Harbridge Merch. Servs., Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 777 (7th Cir. 1994)) (stating that the overly general 
allegations would result in burdensome discovery that could turn the relator’s complaint into a 
“fishing expedition”).  In Harris, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant engaged in Medicare 
fraud.  Id.  The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint under Rule 
9(b) because the complaint included only two specific examples of fraud, which may have even 
been permissible under Medicare regulations.  Id. 
 70. See United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 286 F.3d 542, 551–52 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (rejecting a relator’s claim that his complaint need not comply with Rule 9(b) because his 
complaint alleged “false” claims instead of “fraudulent” ones, and further stating “that the [FCA] 
is self-evidently an anti-fraud statute”); see also Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1018 
(9th Cir. 2001) (highlighting that 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) uses the terms “false or fraudulent,” 
“conspires to defraud,” and “intending to defraud”). 
 71. United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1210–11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(finding that a second application of Rule 9(b) is unnecessary because the complaint would 
already be dismissed at the pleading stage if it did not state fraud with particularity). 
 72. See Charis Ann Mitchell, Comment, A Fraudulent Scheme’s Particularity Under Rule 
9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 LIB. U. L. REV. 337, 365–66 (2010) (arguing that 
Rule 9(b) should not apply to qui tam actions under the FCA because fraud is merely one reason 
why a relator might bring an action); see also Fairman, supra note 64, at 304–05 (advocating for 
the outright elimination of Rule 9(b) because of the courts’ inconsistent application of the rule). 
 73. Mitchell, supra note 72, at 367–68. 
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this standard, Rule 9(b) would be applied to the defendant’s knowledge of 
falsity—the third element of an FCA violation.74 
D.  Slowly Eroding the Exception-Free First-to-File Bar Would Conflict with 
Legislative Intent 
In United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., the Ninth Circuit held 
that the plain language of the first-to-file bar does not include any 
exceptions—a second-filed complaint must be dismissed if a pending action 
based on the same underlying material facts already exists.75  Lujan rejected 
the arguments made by the second-relator that the second action should be 
allowed to proceed because the second-relator was the “original source,” the 
second action was benefiting the Treasury Department, and that the first-filed 
action was subsequently dismissed.76  The Lujan court stated that an  
exception-free approach “conforms with the dual purposes of the 1986 
amendments: to promote incentives for whistle-blowing insiders and prevent 
opportunistic successive plaintiffs.”77 
However, the Lujan court’s succinctly laid out exception-free reading has 
been eroded by numerous challenges to the first-to-file bar.  In Campbell v. 
Redding Medical Center, the Ninth Circuit declined to apply the Lujan rule to 
dismiss a second action because the first-filed action was not initiated by an 
“original source” and thereby failed to meet the jurisdictional prerequisites of 
the public disclosure bar, another FCA provision.78  Unlike the Lujan court, the 
Campbell court stated that construing the first-to-file bar as absolute would be 
contrary to the purpose of the qui tam provisions by encouraging 
“opportunistic plaintiffs with no inside information to displace actual insiders 
                     
 74. See id. at 368 (concluding that such a standard is also consistent with the FCA’s goal of 
encouraging private citizens to bring lawsuits assisting the government, while furthering Rule 
9(b)’s goal of protecting the defendant against overly broad complaints that can negatively impact 
a defendant’s reputation). 
 75. 243 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that the plain language of the statute 
unambiguously creates a first-to-file bar with no exceptions).  Two separate plaintiffs, Linda 
Lujan and William Schumer, filed actions against Hughes Aircraft for entering into unauthorized 
and illegal agreements allocating costs within the B-2 bomber program.  Id. at 1184.  Schumer’s 
action was filed first, but subsequently dismissed.  Id. at 1185.  Nevertheless, the court held that 
Lujan’s second-filed complaint was barred because Schumer’s complaint was a pending action 
under § 3730(b)(5).  Id. at 1183–85. 
 76. Id. at 1183–85. 
 77. Id. at 1187 (refusing to read exceptions into the statute’s plain language). 
 78. 421 F.3d 817, 825 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the first-to-file bar applies only if a 
complaint satisfies the requirements under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4), the public disclosure bar).  
Second-relator Patrick Campbell, a physician, alleged the same material facts as the first relators 
against Redding Medical Center.  Id. at 819. 
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with knowledge of the fraud.”79  Following Campbell, the  
first-to-file bar’s exception-free characteristic began to erode.80 
In United States ex rel. Poteet v. Medtronic, Inc., the Sixth Circuit agreed 
with the Ninth Circuit’s Campbell decision and held that if a first-filed qui tam 
action is dismissed on jurisdictional grounds or on other grounds “related to its 
viability as a federal action,” the first action cannot preclude a later-filed suit 
under the first-to-file bar.81  Further, the Sixth Circuit, citing Lujan, held that 
first-filed complaints dismissed on their merits might preclude subsequent 
complaints, under the first-to-file bar, even if the subsequent complaints were 
more meritorious.82  In reaching this conclusion, the Poteet court 
misinterpreted Lujan as embodying the proposition that only a  
merit-based dismissal could preclude a later-filed suit.83  Rather, Lujan 
established a bright-line rule that when a first-filed suit is pending when a 
second action is filed, the second action must be dismissed under the  
first-to-file bar, regardless of whether and why the first-filed action is 
dismissed.84  Nonetheless, the Campbell and Poteet holdings illustrate the 
growing trend to permit exceptions to the first-to-file bar that were unintended 
by Congress.85 
                     
 79. Id. at 824. 
 80. See United States ex rel. Poteet v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 F.3d 503, 516–17 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that in order to preclude subsequent actions, a first-to-file action must not itself be 
jurisdictionally barred). 
 81. Id. (“Indeed, if the first complaint is either jurisdictionally precluded, or legally 
incapable of serving as a complaint, then it does not properly qualify as a ‘pending action’ 
brought under the FCA.” (internal citations omitted)).  In Poteet, two relators filed suit against 
Medtronic for illegal kickback violations before plaintiff Jacqueline Kay Poteet filed a qui tam 
complaint alleging the same material facts.  Id. at 508. 
 82. Id. at 516–17.  In United States ex rel. Heineman-Guta v. Guidant Corp., 874 F. Supp. 
2d 35 (D. Mass. 2012), relator Heidi Heineman-Guta, an account manager for Guidant 
Corporation, alleged that Guidant induced and rewarded doctors if they recommended Guidant’s 
cardiac rhythm device.  874 F. Supp. at 36–37.  Heineman-Guta provided specific examples of 
so-called kickbacks that were offered to the doctors.  Id.  The court agreed with the concurrence’s 
skepticism in Poteet on whether a first-filed complaint dismissed on its merits should be able to 
bar subsequent, more meritorious complaints.  Id. at 39 (sharing the skepticism of Judge David 
McKeague’s concurring opinion in Poteet regarding the Sixth Circuit’s first-to-file requirements). 
 83. Poteet, 552 F.3d at 515–16. 
 84. See United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 1188 (9th Cir. 
2001) (explaining that the later-filed suit was brought in 1992 while the first-filed suit was still 
pending and the first-filed suit was not dismissed until 1997); see United States ex rel. Piacentile 
v. Sanofi Synthelabo, Inc., No. 05-2927, 2010 WL 5466043, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2010) 
(agreeing with Lujan’s holding that a first-filed complaint, which is pending when the subsequent 
complaint is filed, is a “pending action” even if the first-filed complaint is later dismissed). 
 85. Lujan, 243 F.3d at 1187 (finding as a matter of fact that the first-to-file bar’s plain 
language does not contain exceptions, and the original purposes of the 1986 amendments 
demonstrate that exceptions were never originally intended). 
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E.  Significant Recent Exceptions to the First-to-File Bar in Walburn and 
Batiste Show the Urgency of a Solution 
The most recent illustrations of the first-to-file bar’s erosion are the Sixth 
and D.C. Circuits’ approaches on whether Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure should be incorporated into the first-to-file bar.86  If Rule 9(b) 
is read into the jurisdictional bar, later-filed suits that comply with Rule 9(b)’s 
particularity requirements would be not precluded by the first-filed suit that 
violated Rule 9(b).87 
1.  Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp. 
In Walburn, the plaintiff-relator Jeff Walburn filed a qui tam suit under the 
FCA against defendant Lockheed Martin for allegedly falsifying records 
containing compensation and incentive payments required to operate an Ohio 
diffusion plant under a contract with the United States.88  Specifically, 
Walburn alleged that Lockheed Martin changed the reading of his dosimeter, 
which measures individual doses of radiation exposure, after he was exposed 
to radiation gases as a security officer at the Ohio plant.89  Lockheed Martin 
was required to keep records for each employee as part of the terms of their 
contract with the United States.90  Lockheed Martin’s compliance with the 
terms allowed the company to maintain accreditation from the Department of 
Energy and receive payment from the federal government.91 
The district court dismissed Walburn’s complaint under the FCA’s  
first-to-file bar because it found that an earlier filed complaint alleged the same 
material facts as Walburn’s complaint.92  The earlier-filed complaint alleged 
that Lockheed Martin: 
[I]mproperly disposed of toxic waste in and around ports in violation 
of an affirmative statutory and contractual duty to report 
environmental spills as a condition of payment under their contract 
                     
 86. See United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 2011); 
Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 973 (6th Cir. 2005); see also infra Part I.E.1–2 
(discussing Batiste and Walburn). 
 87. See Walburn, 431 F.3d at 973 (holding that a complaint that is insufficient under Rule 
9(b) is not a complaint for the purposes of the first-to-file bar and, therefore, has no preemptive 
effect). 
 88. Id. at 969.  Relator Jeff Walburn alleged that he was employed as a security officer at 
the Ohio plant and patrolled the uranium and nuclear storage areas.  Id. 
 89. Id.  Walburn alleged that Lockheed changed employees’ readings between four hundred 
and six hundred times to maintain accreditation from the Department of Energy.  Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. United States ex rel. Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 936, 940–41 
(S.D. Ohio 2004), aff’d, 431 F.3d 966 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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with the United States government, and they received payment from 
the government for the proper disposal of the toxic waste.93 
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, Walburn argued the first-filed complaint 
should not preempt his complaint because the allegations in the first-filed 
complaint were “so fatally broad” that they violated Rule 9(b)’s particularity 
requirement.94  The Sixth Circuit agreed with Walburn that  the first-filed 
complaint was “legally infirm from its inception,” therefore violative of Rule 
9(b), and as a result, could not preclude a later-filed suit.95  Despite finding that 
a first-filed complaint that violates Rule 9(b) cannot preempt a later-filed 
complaint, the Sixth Circuit still dismissed Walburn’s complaint under  
§ 3730(e)(4)’s public disclosure bar that prohibits allegations based on publicly 
disclosed information and made by someone other than the original source.96 
2. United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp. 
In Batiste, the relator, Sheldon Batiste, filed a complaint on June 13, 2008, 
in which he accused SLM Corporation97 of knowingly submitting false claims 
to the government, which stated that it had complied with federal laws and 
regulations.98  Batiste, a former senior loan associate at SLM, asserted that the 
company routinely and unlawfully granted forbearances on student loans in 
order to reduce delinquencies.99  In response, SLM argued that Batiste’s 
complaint alleged nearly identical facts to an earlier-filed complaint.100  The 
                     
 93. United States ex rel. Brooks v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. Civ. L-00-1088, 2005 WL 
841997, at *1 (D. Md. April 24, 2000) (alleging other fraudulent activity including that Lockheed 
Martin represented to the government that it had “corrected various Occupational Safety and 
Health Act (OSHA) violations,” “operated ports at below normal production capacity without 
disclosing this information to the government,” and retaliated against the plaintiff in violation of 
the FCA’s anti-discrimination provisions). 
 94. Walburn, 431 F.3d at 972 (characterizing the first-relator’s complaint as a “haystack of 
fraud set forth . . . [that] may . . . be said to ‘encompass’ the needle of the specific fraud Walburn 
seeks to bring to the government’s attention”). 
 95. Id. at 972–73 (stating that “[a] complaint that fails to give adequate notice to the 
defendant can hardly be said to have given the government notice”). 
 96. Id. at 975–76. 
 97. “SLM” is commonly known as Sallie Mae.  See United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM 
Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 98. Id. (stating that Sheldon Batiste alleged that Sallie Mae was defrauding the government, 
from October 5, 2004 to June 13, 2008 by submitting false certifications to the government 
regarding the accuracy of SLM’s student-loan data). 
 99. Id.  Batiste alleged that loan managers told loan officers like himself to “‘forget’ their 
formal training and to grant forbearances to ‘anyone who is delinquent regardless of excuse or 
whether the borrower had any intention of ever repaying the loan.’”  Id. at 1207. 
 100. United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 740 F. Supp. 2d 98, 101 (D.D.C. 2010), 
aff’d, 659 F.3d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  SLM also argued that the plaintiff was not the original 
source of the information because the information was available in the public domain before the 
plaintiff filed his complaint.  Id.  In the alternative, SLM argued that the case should be dismissed 
because the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for relief due to a insufficient facts to infer fraud.  Id.  
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first-filed complaint alleged that SLM knowingly falsified forbearance records 
to indicate that the borrowers orally agreed to forbearances even though the 
company never actually spoke to the borrowers.101  The first-filed complaint 
was dismissed by the district court without prejudice for failing to obtain 
counsel within the applicable time parameters.102  Even though the first-filed 
claim was subsequently dismissed, the district court found that Batiste’s 
complaint was precluded under the first-to-file bar.103 
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit, in a matter of first impression, held that  
“first-filed complaints need not meet the heightened standard of Rule 9(b) to 
bar later complaints; they must provide only sufficient notice for the 
government to initiate an investigation into the allegedly fraudulent practices, 
should it choose to do so.”104  In reaching its holding, the court rejected 
Walburn, noting that § 3730(b)(5)’s language does not require first-filed 
complaints to meet Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement to bar subsequent 
complaints.105  In refusing to follow Walburn, the court noted that such a 
requirement “would not minimize duplicative claims, would encourage 
opportunistic behavior, and would have a negligible impact on desirable 
whistle-blowing.”106 
II.  THE WALBURN AND BATISTE APPROACHES UNNECESSARILY STRETCH THEIR 
OWN PRECEDENT 
A.  Walburn’s “Legally-Infirm” Rationale is Inconsistent With Sixth Circuit 
Precedent as to What Features of a Complaint Serve to Preclude Later-Filed 
Complaints 
In Walburn, the Sixth Circuit did not apply the first-to-file bar when the 
first-filed complaint failed to meet Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement.  The 
approach taken in Walburn is best demonstrated by the following statement in 
the court’s decision: 
                                                
Lastly, SLM argued that the plaintiff lacked standing because SLM is “merely a passive holding 
company that has no role to play in granting forbearances.”  Id. 
 101. Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1207 (alleging that SLM undertook these actions relating to 
forbearance records in order to maintain its “Exceptional Performer” status, which allowed SLM 
to receive higher-guarantee payments than other lenders on its defaulted loans). 
 102. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Zahara v. SLM Corp., No. 1:06-cv-088-SEB-JMS (S.D. 
Ind. March 12, 2009)). 
 103. Batiste, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 103, 104–05 (finding that Batiste’s attempt to differentiate 
his complaint from the first-filed complaint was feeble and rejecting Batiste’s argument that  
the first-filed complaint was not a “pending action”). 
 104. Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1210. 
 105. Id. (“The command is simple: as long as a first-filed complaint remains pending, no 
related complaint may be filed.”). 
 106. Id. at 1211 (quoting United States ex rel. Folliard v. Synnex Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d 66, 
74 (D.D.C. 2011)). 
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[W]e fail to see how according preemptive effect to a fatally broad 
complaint furthers the policy of encouraging whistleblowers to notify 
the government of potential frauds.  A complaint that is insufficient 
under Rule 9(b) is dismissed precisely because it fails to provide 
adequate notice to the defendant of the fraud it alleges.107 
In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit rejected the district court’s 
holding that a subsequently filed suit alleging the same material facts as the 
first-filed suit is barred under § 3730(b)(5).108 
Walburn’s view that a complaint that is jurisdictionally “infirm” under Rule 
9(b) cannot preempt a future complaint was taken an unfortunate step further 
by Poteet, in which the Sixth Circuit narrowly held that a first-filed complaint 
dismissed on its merits, might bar more meritorious subsequent complaints.109  
Notwithstanding the Poteet holding, the Sixth Circuit should hold that a  
first-filed complaint that is dismissed on its merits is “legally-infirm from its 
inception” when compared to a meritorious complaint that fails merely because 
of a jurisdictional bar.110  Under such a holding, meritless first-filed complaints 
will not preclude more meritorious later-filed complaints.111 
Furthermore, numerous circuits, including the Sixth Circuit, have held that 
the purpose of an exception to the first-to-file bar is to “further the policy of 
encouraging whistleblowers to notify the government of potential frauds.”112  
Allowing meritless complaints to preclude a later-filed complaint will only 
discourage private citizens from bringing forth actions.113  As such, neither 
Walburn nor Poteet establish exceptions to the first-to-file bar that comport 
with FCA policy.114 
                     
 107. Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 973 (6th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the 
defendant’s argument that reading Rule 9(b) into the first-to-file bar creates an exception to the 
exception-free rule). 
 108. See id. at 972 (calling the district court’s conclusion “unremarkable” because it does not 
answer whether an overly-broad complaint should preclude subsequent complaints).  The district 
court, applying the “material facts” test, did not raise Rule 9(b) as an issue in its holding.  See 
United States ex rel. Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 936, 941 (S.D. Ohio 
2004), aff’d, 431 F.3d 966 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 109. See United States ex rel. Poteet v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 F.3d 503, 516–17 (6th Cir. 
2009). 
 110. See Brief of Appellee SLM Corp. at 25–26, Batiste, 659 F.3d 1204 (No. 10-7140) 
(arguing that Walburn’s “legally infirm from its inception” principle can be applied to a variety of 
complaints, including failure to state a claim). 
 111. Poteet, 552 F.3d at 516–17 (stating that a first-filed complaint dismissed on its merits 
can still preclude a later-filed and more meritorious complaint under the first-to-file bar). 
 112. Walburn, 431 F.3d at 973; see Poteet, 552 F.3d at 516–17; Campbell v. Redding Med. 
Ctr., 421 F.3d 817, 825 (9th Cir. 2005); supra Part I.D.  But cf. United States ex rel. Lujan v. 
Hughes Aircraft Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating unequivocally that the  
first-to-file bar “does not contain exceptions”). 
 113. See, e.g., Walburn, 431 F.3d at 973 (finding that “according preemptive effect to a 
factually-broad complaint” will not result in promoting whistleblower actions). 
 114. See supra Part I.A (discussing FCA’s qui tam provisions’ purpose). 
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B.  Batiste’s Claim that Rule 9(b) Is a Separate FCA Pleading Requirement 
Confuses D.C. Precedent 
Although Walburn did not directly address the issue, it implicitly held that 
when the complaint is originally filed, a court should examine whether the 
first-filed complaint satisfies the “particularity” requirement and that the 
examination should also occur when a later-filed suit alleges that it should not 
be barred by § 3730(b)(5).115  Conversely, Batiste stated that “[e]ven without 
grafting a Rule 9(b) requirement onto the first-to-file rule, the first plaintiff’s 
complaint is still subject to the Rule 9(b) pleading requirements in order for the 
court to hear the case.”116 
Although Batiste suggests that every first-filed complaint is measured by 
Rule 9(b) in order to survive dismissal, the D.C. Circuit and D.C. District 
Court’s practice on how to apply Rule 9(b) is less definitive.117  In United 
States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, the court presented Rule 9(b)’s requirement as 
a statement of the “time, place and content of the false misrepresentations, the 
fact misrepresented and what was obtained or given up as a consequence of the 
fraud,”118 but then continued that Rule 9(b) should not be “read in isolation.”119  
As a result, the court concluded that “Rule 9(b)’s requirement of particularity 
is a less certain standard for measuring the sufficiency of a complaint,”120 
suggesting that it may be permissible for a court to not dismiss a complaint that 
does not allege fraud with particularity.121  Although the Joseph court 
dismissed the complaint for its deficient pleading, the dismissal was not due to 
                     
 115. See Walburn, 431 F.3d at 972 (stating that plaintiffs alleging FCA violations must do so 
with particularity as required by Rule 9(b) and striking down the first-filed complaint because it 
failed the “particularity” requirement even though the complaint should have already been subject 
to Rule 9(b)). 
 116. United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(calling the second application of Rule 9(b) “unnecessary” and suggesting that the would-be 
relator should be unable to receive a monetary award as a result). 
 117. See United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding 
allegations that a senator accepted unauthorized payment as too vague to overcome a Rule 9(b) 
analysis); United States ex rel. Ortega v. Columbia Healthcare, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 8, 18–19 
(D.D.C. 2003) (concluding that a description of a hospital’s fraudulent scheme and pleading with 
sufficient particularity to proceed under Rule 9(b)). 
 118. Joseph, 642 F.2d at 1385 (quoting 2A JAMES MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE  
¶ 9.03, at 9-20 to 9-24 (2d ed. 1980)). 
 119. Id. at 1386.  In Joseph, the relator alleged that former Nevada Senator Howard Cannon 
authorized payments to his administrative assistant even though the assistant was not performing 
“official legislative and representational duties,” thus making the salary payments false claims to 
the Treasury Department.  Id. at 1375–76. 
 120. Id.  Despite the court’s finding that the complaint was overly “generalized and vague,” 
the court was not prepared to dismiss the complaint for lack of particularity.  Id. 
 121. Id. at 1385–86. 
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a strict reading of Rule 9(b), but because of the plaintiff’s insufficient  
eleven-month effort to remedy the complaint’s deficiencies.122 
Similar to Joseph, the court in United States ex rel. Ortega v. Columbia 
Healthcare, Inc., noting that the D.C. Circuit takes a “generous approach to 
pleadings,” stating that Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement does “not 
completely vitiate the liberality of Rule 8.”123  In Ortega, the court concluded 
that a plaintiff having filed an ordinarily deficient complaint would be granted 
leave to amend, but declined to provide such leave in the case because the 
complaint was insufficient for failure to state a claim.124 
Based on its own precedent, the Batiste court should re-examine its rationale 
that Rule 9(b) is not necessary for the first-to-file bar because it is applied at 
the pleading stage.125  The court asserted that a complaint might be sufficient 
to alert the government of fraudulent activity, but still be dismissed for failing 
to state the fraud with sufficient particularity.126  However, the precedent 
indicates that the D.C. Circuit applies a generous approach to Rule 9(b) at the 
pleading stage, such that the the heightened standard required to protect against 
“parasitic suits” may be less effective than Batiste asserts.127 
C.  Rule 9(b), As Demonstrated in Batiste and Walburn, is Inconsistently 
Applied, Resulting in Inconsistent Rules 
As the different approaches between past D.C. Circuit precedent and 
Walburn indicate, courts inconsistently apply Rule 9(b).128  The scarce 
                     
 122. Id. (stating that the usual method for allowing a litigant his day in court is to grant leave 
to amend or to dismiss the complaint without prejudice; however, those methods are not available 
if the litigant does not display an effort to comply with pleading requirements). 
 123. 240 F. Supp. 2d 8, 18 (D.D.C. 2003).  Rule 8 requires a “short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).  In Ortega, a relator 
filed suit alleging that HCA-owned Columbia Medical Center West fraudulently procured 
certification as a healthcare organization, which precluded it from participating in Medicare.  Id. 
at 11.  The relator argued that Columbia Healthcare falsely submitted claims for Medicare 
reimbursement and fraudulently booked costs to raise the base for Medicare funding.  Id. 
 124. See id. at 18–19 (finding that the complaint failed to connect the alleged fraudulent 
scheme of falsifying committee minutes with claims for payment). 
 125. See United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(“The threat of a second application of Rule 9(b) is unnecessary.”). 
 126. See id. at 1210; see also United States ex rel. Folliard v. Synnex Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d 
66, 74 (D.D.C. 2011) (stating that if the government knows the essential facts of the fraud, the 
complaint may be dismissed under Rule 9(b) and yet still preclude subsequent complaints stating 
the same fraud with particularity required under Rule 9(b)). 
 127. See Ortega, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 18–19 (noting the leniency of the D.C. Circuit); see also 
United States ex rel. LaCorte v. Smith Kline Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc., 149 F. 3d 227, 223 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (quoting Pettis ex rel. United States v. Morrison Co., 577 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1978) 
(commenting that the FCA’s purpose was to avoid “parasitic suits”)). 
 128. See Richman, Lively & Mell, supra note 60, at 973.  Compare Tomera v. Galt, 511 F.2d 
504, 508 (7th Cir. 1975) (concluding that, to give defendants notice, Rule 9(b) requires “slightly 
more” than the liberal approach of Rule 8), overruled by Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 
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legislative history on Rule 9(b) leaves courts to develop their own 
interpretations of a heightened pleading standard.129  In United States ex rel. 
Bledsoe v. Community Health Systems, Inc., the Sixth Circuit stated that Rule 
9(b) “enables defendants to prepare an informed pleading responsive to the 
specific allegations of fraud.”130  One commentator argues that this rationale 
makes Rule 9(b) superfluous because it does not further Rule 8 pleading 
standards.131  If a complaint alleging fraud is too vague for a response, other 
remedies exist for the defendant such as a motion for a more definite statement 
or a motion to dismiss.132 
Courts take various approaches when applying Rule 9(b), including 
conducting a “circumstances” analysis, requiring the plaintiff to plead elements 
of fraud, requiring particularity to be “simple, brief, and designed to give the 
defendant fair notice of the fraud claim,” or requiring exact details of the 
fraud.133  This inconsistent application and seemingly unnecessary existence 
has led one commentator to call for the outright elimination of Rule 9(b).134  
Other commentators argue that the particularity requirement should only apply 
to the defendant’s knowledge of falsity.135 
Striking Rule 9(b) altogether may not be the answer in FCA suits given the 
deep-rooted history and widespread agreement that Rule 9(b) should apply in 
some form at the pleading stage.  Rule 9(b)’s application beyond the early 
pleading stage, however, is the primary source of inconsistent court rules: 
either courts preclude complaints that violate Rule 9(b) as against the 
                                                
F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990), with Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 469 (2d Cir. 1978) (applying a 
strict approach to particularity). 
 129. See Richman, Lively & Mell, supra note 60, at 965 (citing Advisory Committee drafts, 
congressional hearings, and American Bar Association proceedings and finding virtually no 
mention of Rule 9(b)). 
 130. 501 F.3d 493, 509 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted).  In Bledsoe, the relator, a 
respiratory staff therapist at one of the several hospitals owned by Community Health Systems, 
alleged that the hospital was engaged in “illegal and fraudulent billing practices.”  Id. at 497.  The 
court held that a “paragraph-by-paragraph” approach by a court for determining Rule 9(b) 
sufficiency is required and that courts should narrowly construe a false or fraudulent scheme.  Id. 
at 509–10. 
 131. See Fairman, supra note 64, at 296–97.  Other purposes for Rule 9(b) include: “defense 
of settled transactions, protection of defendants’ reputations, [and] deterrence of frivolous or 
strike suits.”  Id. at 290. 
 132. See id. at 296–97 (stating that missing details should be remedied through motions or 
obtained through the regular discovery process). 
 133. See id. at 297–99 (asserting that a court’s chosen approach is based largely on its 
rationalization for the Rule). 
 134. See id. at 299, 304–05, 307 (arguing that if Rule 9(b) is not challenged, it will 
“contaminate other substantive areas of law”). 
 135. See Mitchell, supra note 72, at 337, 374 (arguing that, because fraud is only one reason 
for bringing a FCA action, the particularity requirement should not be imposed on all qui tam 
suits). 
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defendant but not for first-to-file purposes,136 or courts do not apply Rule 9(b) 
to the first-to-file bar because it would be duplicative.137 
III.  FUTURE COURTS SHOULD ADHERE TO LUJAN’S ZERO-EXCEPTION RULE 
FOR THE FIRST-TO-FILE BAR 
In Lujan, the court stated that “an exception-free, first-to-file bar conforms 
with the dual purposes of the 1986 amendments: to promote incentives for 
whistle-blowing insiders and [to] prevent opportunistic successive 
plaintiffs.”138  Even though courts have acknowledged this exception-free 
principle, in practice, they have failed to apply it.139  Most notably, by holding 
that a first-filed complaint violative of Rule 9(b) is “legally infirm from its 
inception,” thereby permitting later-filed suits to proceed, courts have created 
an exception to the first-to-file bar.140  Creation of such exceptions indicates 
that courts are heading down a slippery slope with respect to the original intent 
of the first-to-file bar and are creating more confusion than clarity. 
In order to prevent further erosion of the first-to-file bar, courts should 
develop rules based on the purposes of the bar and Rule 9(b).141  Courts can 
consistently apply the first-to-file bar to cases as long as the rule is  
exception-free.  Particularly, Rule 9(b) should not be read into the first-to-file 
bar because: (1) a complaint should not be dismissed while still precluding 
subsequent complaints alleging the same material facts; and (2) a complaint 
dismissed on its merits should have the same non-preclusion impact as a 
complaint dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
A.  Meritless Complaints Should Not Preclude Later-Filed Complaints and 
Jurisdictionally-Barred Complaints Should Preclude Later-Filed Complaints 
The basic purpose of the first-to-file bar is to incentivize whistleblowers to 
file suits, while discouraging duplicative claims that do not help reduce 
fraud.142  Yet another purpose, and perhaps a more important one, of the  
first-to-file bar is to prevent the “practical effect of dividing the bounty among 
                     
 136. See United States ex rel. Poteet v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 F.3d 503, 517 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 137. See United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 138. United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(rejecting the second relator’s contentions that the first-to-file bar should not apply to her case 
because her complaint would benefit the Treasury, she had personal knowledge of the fraudulent 
activity, and she informed the government of her allegations before the first complaint was filed). 
 139. See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text (discussing Poteet’s misinterpretation of 
Lujan). 
 140. See Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 972 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 141. For a brief history and explanation of Rule 9(b)’s purpose, see Mitchell, supra note 72, 
at 344. 
 142. Skillen & Scheurer, supra note 3, at 76 (quoting Unites States ex rel. Ortega v. 
Columbia Healthcare, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 8, 12 (D.D.C. 2003)) (arguing for a  
strict-interpretation of the first-to-file rule in order to adhere closely to Congress’ goal of 
encouraging whistleblowers to file actions as soon as they learn of fraud on the government). 
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more and more relators, thereby reducing the incentive to come forward with 
information on wrongdoing.”143  Certainly, disputes over the first-filed suit 
affect litigants because of the potential for a monetary award, particularly if the 
government chooses to join the action.144 
Unfortunately, courts have not developed rules with this practicality in 
mind.145  For example, Poteet held that a first-filed qui tam suit dismissed on 
its merits could still preclude a more meritorious, later-filed suit.146  Walburn 
noted that a first-filed suit that was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds 
precluded a later-filed suit.147  These holdings do not conform to the basic 
purpose of the first-to-file bar, which is to alert the government of fraudulent 
activity.148  A complaint dismissed on its merits, by definition, is more likely to 
lead the government astray—or at least preoccupy valuable resources in 
determining whether it is a claim worth pursuing—as opposed to a dismissed 
complaint that is merely jurisdictionally insufficient.  For example, although a 
complaint pled by a non-original source, which is one form of jurisdictional 
insufficiency, raises the possibility of inaccurate information being provided to 
the government, a meritless complaint will almost certainly provide 
information that is plainly false.149 
Second, allowing meritless complaints but not jurisdictionally deficient 
complaints, discourages whistleblowers from coming forward and alerting the 
government of fraud.  For example, if a private citizen knew of fraudulent 
activity occurring within a company he may not immediately file a complaint 
because, if his lawyer drafts an insufficient complaint, he may be subject to a 
                     
 143. Ortega, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 12. 
 144. See BOESE, supra note 5, at 4-268 (stating that one of the most important changes of the 
1986 amendment was to increase relators’ awards to a maximum of thirty percent of the proceeds 
of the action).  Often, the potential for the greatest reward occurs when the government chooses 
to intervene because of the government’s plethora of resources and selectivity in choosing cases 
that are likely to maximize the return on its investment.  See John C. Ruhnka, Edward J. Gac & 
Heidi Boerstler, Qui Tam Claims: Threat to Voluntary Compliance Programs in Health Care 
Organizations, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 283, 301–03 (2000) (describing the prospects of 
substantial rewards when the government joins); see also Michael Lawrence Kolis, Comment, 
Settling for Less: The Department of Justice’s Command Performance Under the 1986 False 
Claims Amendments Act, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 409, 444 (1993) (stating that the heavy burden on 
the Department of Justice to litigate FCA claims has caused it to pursue only cases that will yield 
financial rewards). 
 145. See United States ex rel. Poteet v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 F.3d 503, 517–18 (6th Cir. 
2009); Walburn, 431 F.3d at 972–73. 
 146. Poteet, 552 F.3d at 517–18. 
 147. Walburn, 431 F.3d at 972. 
 148. See Skillen & Scheurer, supra note 3, at 76 (“The basic objective of the qui tam 
provisions is, after all, to enable the government, through private enforcement, to restore stolen 
money to the federal fisc.”). 
 149. See Elletta S. Callahan & Terry M. Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich: Financial 
Incentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273, 325 (1992) 
(acknowledging commentators who believe that greed of increased rewards encourages more 
meritless claims that waste government resources). 
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jurisdictional bar, leaving someone else to potentially reap the monetary 
reward.  The better rule would be to apply the first-to-file bar on complaints 
that are dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. 
B.  Dismissing a Complaint Against the Defendant, but Not for Purposes of the 
First-to-File Rule, Misses the Point 
Recent courts have held that there is a sliding scale of particularity required 
at the pleading stage.150  In United States ex rel. Folliard v. Synnex Corp., the 
D.C. Circuit agreed with the rationale in Batiste that a complaint may state 
sufficient information to put the government on notice for purposes of the  
first-to-file bar, yet not state the activity with enough particularity to put the 
defendant on notice.151  Although this reasoning recognizes the purpose of 
alerting the government to fraud, it is contrary to the purpose of incentivizing 
private citizens to bring forth claims.152  If a relator foresees that his or her 
complaint will be dismissed, but the government may still use the information 
the relator provided in the complaint to bring a suit against the defendant, then 
the relator may be discouraged from bringing the suit initially.153  In that case, 
the government will not be alerted to the possible fraud.154 
In 2011, the government recovered over three billion dollars from successful 
actions, of which ninety-three percent was due to whistleblowers.155  If courts 
were to closely follow a rule in which a complaint is dismissed against the 
defendant, but the government still pursues the case, clarification would be 
needed regarding whether the initial relator is entitled to a resulting monetary 
reward.  If courts erode that possibility over time, the effectiveness of the qui 
                     
 150. See United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 740 F. Supp. 2d 98, 104 (D.D.C. 2010) 
(discussing the different levels of particularity required to satisfy the first-to-file bar and the Rule 
9(b) requirement), aff’d, 659 F.3d 1204. 
 151. 798 F. Supp. 2d 66, 74 (D.D.C. 2011) (arguably agreeing with a possible Walburn-type 
approach in certain situations by stating that there are some cases in which a prior complaint 
dismissed for failing Rule 9(b) does not preclude subsequent complaints).  The Folliard court 
stated that the government’s investigation into the first-filed complaint sufficiently revealed facts 
that were also included in the second-filed complaint, and thus, the second complaint should be 
dismissed under § 3730(b)(5).  Id.; see also Batiste, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 104 (disagreeing with 
Walburn’s finding that a complaint dismissed under Rule 9(b) cannot provide notice to the 
government); United States ex rel. Piacentile v. Sanofi Synthelabo, Inc., No. 05-2927, 2010 WL 
5466043, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2010) (arguing that since a qui tam claim is kept under seal for at 
least 60 days, the government’s ensuing investigation is presumed to result in notice to the 
government notwithstanding the notice to the defendant). 
 152. See supra Part I.A. 
 153. See Scarcella, supra note 14, at 3 (noting that whistleblowers will be wary of bringing 
actions if there is a high probability that the action will be dismissed). 
 154. See Mitchell, supra note 72, at 340 (stating that the government’s reliance on 
whistleblowers to uncover fraud). 
 155. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers $3 Billion in False Claims 
Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2011 (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa 
/pr/2011/December/11-civ-1665.html. 
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tam provisions will likely decrease substantially.156  If courts disregard the 
monetary incentive for bringing suits forward, the FCA will suffer a 
detrimental impact, given the other potential negative consequences of 
whistleblowing.157 
C.  Eliminating the Slowly Evolving “Particularity” Exception to the  
First-to-File Bar Is a Practical Solution 
The Batiste court, in reaching its conclusion—that as long as a first-filed 
action is “pending,” any subsequently-filed complaint is barred by the  
first-to-file rule—reasoned that if it followed Walburn’s approach of reading a 
particularity requirement into § 3730(b)(5), a “strange judicial dynamic” would 
be created.158  The Batiste court sought to avoid creating a requirement in 
which one court in a given jurisdiction was forced to evaluate whether a court 
in a different jurisdiction correctly decided the sufficiency of a complaint.159 
In addition to Batiste’s practical approach toward Rule 9(b), courts should 
only apply Rule 9(b) during the pleading stage.160  After extensive analysis, 
one commentator concluded that “[d]ecades of inconsistent treatment by the 
federal bench now obscure whatever the drafters thought was the proper way 
to apply the Rule [9(b)].  Uniformity is an illusory goal.”161  The fact-specific 
approach taken by courts in the context of FCA claims caused an uncertain 
outcome as to whether a complaint will be excluded by the first-to-file bar.162  
Courts should recognize this ongoing phenomenon and eliminate a 
particularity requirement from the first-to-file bar. 
                     
 156. See James F. Barger, Jr., Pamela H. Bucy, Melinda M. Eubanks & Marc S. Raspanti, 
States, Statutes, and Fraud: An Empirical Study of Emerging State False Claims Acts, 80 TUL. L. 
REV. 465, 471–73 (2005) (explaining that the 1986 amendments “invigorat[ed] qui tam actions” 
by relaxing jurisdictional bar provisions and increasing relator rewards). 
 157. See id. (noting the increase of qui tam cases after the 1986 amendments to the FCA). 
 158. United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see 
United States ex rel. Heineman-Guta v. Guidant Corp., 874 F. Supp. 2d 35, 41 (D. Mass. 2012) 
(agreeing with the Batiste court that the “strange judicial dynamic” of asking one court to 
evaluate another jurisdiction’s determination of legal sufficiency should be avoided); United 
States ex rel. Piacentile v. Sanofi Synthelabo, Inc., No. 05-2927, 2010 WL 5466043, at *5 (D.N.J. 
Dec. 30, 2010) (interpreting the Walburn holding to suggest that the first-filed complaint did not 
preclude Walburn’s subsequent complaint, even if the first court had found that the first filed 
complaint satisfied Rule 9(b)). 
 159. Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1210. 
 160. See Miller v. Holtzmann, No. Civ.A.95-1231RCLJMF, 2006 WL 568722, at *8 (D.D.C. 
March 9, 2006) (providing the standard for determining whether the particularity requirement has 
been satisfied at the pleading stage when the complaint is first filed).  The Miller court stated that, 
under D.C. District Court precedent, Rule 9(b) and Rule 8(a) must be read together to require the 
plaintiff “to state, for example, the time, place and content of false representations made to induce 
the government to pay the false claim.”  Id. 
 161. Fairman, supra note 64, at 297–98. 
 162. See supra Part I.E (discussing the differing approaches  between the Ninth and D.C. 
Circuits). 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
“Why would I tell my client to jeopardize his career to bring a complaint 
that will be barred?”163  This quote by Robert Vogel, an attorney with a 
Washington D.C. law firm, demonstrates the real-world implications that result 
from the various approaches taken by the Sixth and D.C. Circuits.  If Walburn 
is followed, then whistleblowers may be reluctant to bring valuable 
information to the government.  If Batiste is followed, complaints could be 
dismissed against the defendant for reasons other than the first-to-file bar, and 
whistleblowers may be reluctant to bring suits without the incentive of a 
monetary reward. 
To resolve this dilemma, courts should adhere to the exception-free rule 
envisioned in Lujan.  To appropriately apply this rule and serve the purpose of 
the first-to-file bar, courts should not read Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement 
into the first-to-file bar.  Additionally, complaints dismissed on their merits 
should not preclude later-filed suits, and relators should be given the 
opportunity to state a claim with sufficient particularity. 
 
                     
 163. See Scarcella, supra note 14, at 13 (stating that Sallie Mae “argu[ed] for a free pass for 
all time on the basis the first complaint did not have enough detail, and that is wrong.”). 
